For A., who so often saved me from myself; and for G., that he may recognize and resist.

Racist Culture
Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning

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Racial Knowledge

Use of which constitutes individuals as social subjects—at once of and to the law. Moreover, much of social science practice in South Africa is reducible by mandate to or consistent with apartheid social science. The accompanying appeal to scientific authorization underwrites state policy and rationalizes claims to reform in labor and influx control, in economic deregulation, in the constitution, in education, and in daily life. Exercise of the raw power of repressive state apparatuses is difficult enough on its own to face down; the 'normalization' of disciplinary coercion and control sanctioned by this State Social Science prompts a social collaboration of faceless and silent subjection that only a radical epistemological and axiological transmutation may be able to dislodge.

So racial knowledge is not just information about the racial Other, but its very creation, its fabrication. Racial knowledge has been a foundational structure of the social sciences and humanities, even as it has been denied. It has fenced off in scientific and popular imaginations researchers from research objects; writers from those written about; liberal representatives of civilized modernity's most advanced forms of scientific spirit from less-civilized primitives; epistemological kings of Western civilization from racialized subjects; mature Westerners from infantilized non-Westerners; citizens marked by civility and decorum from the criminal and the vulgar; and urban sophisticates from dwellers of the jungle and the urban jungle. It is in the contemporary sense that apartheid represents a dying past, a past the West has passed beyond, that I now want finally to invert by analyzing the more or less universal constructions of racialized urban spaces. The ultimate and effective material manifestations of racial knowledge, then, are expressed in the related forms of representational and spatial ghettoization. It is to a demonstration of this that I now turn.

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‘Polluting the Body Politic’: Race and Urban Location

‘If I were to wake up one morning and find myself a black man, the only major difference would be geographical.’

The category of space is discursively produced and ordered. Just as spatial distinctions like ‘West’ and ‘East’ are racialized in their conception and application, so racial categories have been variously spatialized more or less since their inception into continental divides, national localities, and geographic regions. Racisms become institutionally normalized in and through spatial configuration, just as social space is made to seem natural, a given, by being conceived and defined in racial terms. Thus, at the limit, apartheid space—so ab-normal and seemingly unnatural—will be shown to be the logical implication of racialized space throughout the legacy, colonial and postcolonial, of the West’s hidden hand (of Reason). The material power of the categorical exclusions implied and produced by racializing discourse and social knowledge will accordingly be exemplified.

Power in the polis, and this is especially true of racialized power, reflects and refines the spatial relations of its inhabitants. Urban power, in turn, is a microcosm of the strengths and weaknesses of state. After all, social relations are not expressed in a spatial vacuum. Differences within urban structure—whether economic, political, cultural, or geographic—are in many ways magnified by and multiply the social hierarchies of power in and between cities, between town and country. These sociospatial dialectics undermine the fact that social space is neither affect nor simply given: The rationalities of social space—its modes of definition, maintenance, distribution, experience, reproduction, and transformation—are at once fundamental influences upon the social relations of power.

Conquering space is implicated in and implies ruling people. The conquest of racialized space was often promoted and rationalized in terms of (where it did not itself prompt) spatial vacancy: the land’s emptiness or emptying of human
settlement were representationally wiped away by two bleaching agents. In the
first instance, they were cleansed by myths of ‘virgin land’ and ‘just wars’. In the
second, those identifying themselves as Europeans turned in whitewashing their
histories to the civilizing mission of ‘saving the impure’ and extending God’s order
over heathen lands. Whether the bodies of the racialized Others were to be killed
or colonized, slaughtered or saved, expunged or exploited, they had to be
prevented at all costs from polluting the body politic or sullying civilized society.

Impurity, dirt, disease, and pollution, it may be recalled from chapter 3, are
expressed by way of transgressing classificatory categories, as also are danger
and the breakdown of order. Threatening to transgress or pollute established social
orders necessitates their reinvention, first by conceptualizing order anew and then
by reproducing spatial confinement and separation in the renewed terms. The main
modes of social exclusion and segregation throughout maturing capitalism and
modernity have been effected in terms of racialized discourse, with its
bodies in their natural and social relations.

I will assess the institutional implications of racialized discourse and racist
expression for the spatial location and consequent marginalization of groups of
people constituted as races. The materiality of racialized relations—of relations
between knowledge and power, rationality and exclusions, identity, opportunity,
and availability—are most clearly in evidence here. In the spatial delimitations
these relations it is human bodies, racialized human beings, that are defined and
confined, delineated yet (dis)located. This will provoke some remarks also about
the spatial affects of racial (dis)location on the preservation of and transformations
in racialized discourse.

The Terms of Spatial Marginalization

Colonizing City Space: Producing Urban Peripheries

It seems uncontroversial to claim that the roots of the racialized postmodern
city can be traced to the end of the colonial era. Not until this juncture did the
metropolises of the West have to confront directly the “problem of the racially
marginalized”, of (re)producing racial marginalization in its own spaces.5
Throughout the colonial era, racial Others were defined in terms both of a different
biology and a different history, indeed, where those ‘othered’ were considered to
have a history at all. Colonial administration required the bureaucratic
rationalization of city space. This entailed that as urbanization of the colonized
accelerated, so the more urgently were those thus racialized forced to occupy a
space apart from their European(ized) masters. The doctrine of segregation was
elaborated largely with the twentieth-century urbanization of racial Others.6 By
contrast, European cities remained until fairly well into this century, from the

Inhabitation. The drive to racialize populations rendered transparent the people so
racialized; it left them unseen, merely part of the natural environment, to be cleared
from the landscape—urban or rural—like debris. The natural and built
environments, then, as well as their modes of representation are made in and reify
the image and architecture of what Foucault aptly calls ‘pyramidal power’.2

Citizens and strangers are controlled through the spatial confines of divided
place. These geometries—the spatial categories through and in which the lived
world is largely mapped, experienced, and disciplined—impose a set of
interiorities and exteriorities. For modernity, inside has tended to connotate
subjectivity, the realm of deep feelings, of Truth; outside suggests physically,
human difference, strangeness. The dichotomy between inside and outside also
marks, as it is established by marking territory; and in settling territorial divides,
connotations may transform, splinter, reverse. Boundaries around inner space may
establish hegemony over that space, while they loosen in some ways but impose
on others a disciplinary hegemony over the map outside the inner bounds. As the
boundaries between inside and outside shift, so do their implicit values. Inside
may have concrete certainty, outside the vast indecisiveness of the void, of
nothingness, of nonbeing. Outside, by contrast, may avoid the phobic confinement
of inner space.3

This dichotomy between inner and outer intersects with and is both magnified
and transmitted by another one central to the condition of modernity: the
dichotomy between public and private. The truncated spaces of a privatized moral
sphere may prove to be a refuge from the imposed obligations of the public ethic;
the obligatory policies citizenship may impose often cover (up) the exclusionary
practices extended in the name of a private sphere. Public diversity may give way
to private univocality; inner multiplicity may reduce to a segregated singularity
and divide off from differentiated outer homogeneity. Inner and outer may thus
face multiplied connotative inversions. Private inner subjective space may serve
as sanctuary from exposure to public inner city space; the public inner city may
accordingly ‘necessitate’ avoidance by flight to outer suburban space, where the
public realm is largely reduced to instrumentalities. Here, public outer space
circumstantially assumes the privatized virtue of relative autonomy from
bureaucratic imposition. The private order and harmony of subjective inner or
suburban space commands (legally authorized and enforced) protection at its
limits from the incursive dangers of inner urban violence spilling over from center
to periphery. The means invoked to effect this include rendering the center
peripheral. Thus, peripheral space may at once prove liberating and alienating,
free and enclosed, open but empty.

One’s place in the world is not merely a matter of locational coordinates, nor
just a demographic statistic, nor simply a piece of property. It may be also taken,
in Krieger’s suggestion, as a trope for fashioning identity.4 Where the colonial was
‘confronted’ by vast hinterlands to be opened up—in the Americas, Southern
Africa, Australasia—the rivers of red, brown, and black blood required by
viewpoint of residence and control, almost as 'white' as they had been in the Renaissance. By the close of World War II and the sunset of direct colonialism, this had largely changed: (Im)migration of colonial and country people of color to the metropoles of Europe and the Americas was well under way or had already run its course. In the 1950s and 1960s slum administration replaced colonial administration. Exclusion and exclusivity were internalized within the structures of city planning throughout the expanding (cos)metropolises of the emergent 'West'. Fearing contamination from inner city racially defined slums, the white middle class scuttled to the suburbs. The 'tower of Babel' was quickly superseded by the 'tower of the housing project high rise' as the appropriate image of racialized urban space. Local differences notwithstanding, the racial poor were simultaneously rendered peripheral in terms of urban location and marginalized in terms of power. This notion of peripheractic space is relational: It does not require the absolute displacement of persons to or outside city limits, to the literal margins of urban space. It merely entails their circumscription in terms of location and their limitation in terms of access—to power, to (the realization of) rights, and to goods and services. The processes of spatial circumscription may be intentional or structural: They may be imposed by planners upon urban design at a specific time and place, or they may be insinuated into the forms of spatial production and inherent in the terms of social rationalization. Further, the circumscribing fences may be physical or imagined. In short, peripheractic space implies dislocation, displacement, and division. It has become the primary mode by which the space of racial marginality has been articulated and reproduced.

In the 1960s and 1970s a convoluted but ultimately consistent inversion of urban space developed along racially defined class lines. The white middle-class suburban flight left the racially divided inner-city residential neighborhoods to poorer whites and to the racially marginalized. The segregated suburbs were graded in terms of their distance from industry and urban slums and their proximity to the conditions for leisure and consumption: seaside, lake, mountain, countryside, and shopping mall. The openness of the extended urban outside pressed in upon confined racial ghettos. Outer was projected as the locus of desire, the terminus of (upward) mobility; inner was painted as bleak, degenerate space, as the anarchic margin to be avoided. The inevitable gaps in urban order simultaneously provide the soil for cultural proliferation, while suburban uniformity stifles it. Lured by the image of music, drugs, and sex, suburban teenagers became avid consumers of city culture. By the late 1970s young professionals entering the job market no longer wanted to live an hour from the workplace in the central business district, or from the sites of fashionable recreation in the inner city. Personal preference schemes are hardly maximized by time-consuming, crowded commutes. What followed was a reversal of the pattern of white flight: The postmodern inner city may be defined in terms of urban renewal and gentrification—and so also in terms of their absence and denial. The anarchic margin of the inner city was revitalized, a part here and a piece there, into an urban center. The racially marginalized have spent much time and effort trying to improve the built environment they found themselves forced to accept. They are now increasingly displaced, their housing 'rehabilitated'—often with public collusion, if only in the form of tax breaks—and rented or sold at considerable profit. Outside colonizes inside; unable to afford spiraling rents, the inner are turned out, homeless, onto the street. Any urban location represents a potential site for the realization of commercial profit and rent. And profit maximization tends to be blind both to history and to social responsibility. As the social margins are (re)colonized or cut loose, the peripheral is symbolically wiped away. With no place to gather and dislocated from any sense of community, it becomes that much more difficult for dispossessed individuals to offer resistance both to their material displacement and to the rationalizing characteristics that accompany the dislocation.

Racial marginality may assume various forms. Economic instantiations are invariably definitive. The racially marginalized are cast most usually in economic terms: lack of employment opportunities and income, wealth and consumerability, housing and mortgage access. These are factors also defining class position. This highlights an important aspect of racial marginality. It is only necessary to the process of marginalization that some (large) fraction of the racially constituted group be so marginalized, not that all members be displaced (though for reasons concerning personal and cultural identity, the alienation affect for the group at large tends to be almost universal). So, for example, professional blacks may be accepted as neighbors or colleagues by whites, or as more or less full members of the body politic, while the larger fraction of blacks remains displaced to the periphery. This clearly raises questions about class location. While my focus here is to identify those determinations of periphaptic marginalization that are specific to racialized discourse and racist expression, this will necessitate some identification of the intersection of race with class, and the attendant multiplication(s) in social cause, effect, and affect.

Roughly coincidental with changing forms of racial marginalization this century are shifts in the raison d'être of urban planning. Until World War II, urban planning objectives were swept under the banner of the 'city beautiful'. In the early postwar years (until 1960), this concern with environmental aesthetics gave way to demands of social efficiency. This was refined in the 1960s into a 'rational systems model' that set out to define rules of rational decision making for effective urban development and resource allocation. By the 1980s efficiency considerations in the state planning apparatus had largely succumbed to economic interests. This runs so deep now that it largely determines what is or is not technically feasible: Decisions are defined without public debate by the expertise of professional bureaucrats in terms for the most part of returns on capital investment. Even state penetration of urban development has been reduced to privatized corporate commodification: Public space has come effectively to be
controlled by private sector land and property development interests. As Dear comments, 'planning serves to legitimize the actions of capital'.

Planning ideology did not develop in this way either solely in response to or as a directive for the concerns of racial marginalization. Obviously other determinants and an internal logic of its own are formative. Nevertheless, it seems clear that concerns of race have played some considerable part in the unfolding of planning rationale. Kushner, for example, describes how local planning authorities required suburban housing plots to range between half an acre and three acres, thus encouraging development of larger and more expensive housing beyond the means of the racialized poor. At the same time, where apartment buildings were permitted in these suburban towns at all, they were restricted to small one- or two-bedroom units so as to discourage families, and expensive design features required by the building code effectively excluded the racialized poor.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The Significance of the Slum}

Consider in this light the contemporary history of the concept of \textit{slum clearance}. The racial dimensions of the idea were set at the turn of the century by colonial officials fearful of infectious disease and epidemic plague. Unsanitary living conditions among the black urban poor in many of Africa's port cities were exacerbated by profiteering slumlords. Concern heightened among the European colonists that the arrival of the plague, which devastated the indigenous population, would contaminate them. As fast as the plague spread among the urban poor, this 'sanitation syndrome' caught hold of the colonial imagination as a general social metaphor for the pollution by blacks of urban space. Uncivilized Africans, it was claimed, suffered urbanization as a pathology of disorder and degeneration of their traditional tribal life. To prevent their pollution contaminating European city dwellers and services, the idea of sanitation and public health was invoked first as the legal path to remove blacks to separate locations at the city limits and then as the principle for sustaining permanent segregation.

When plague first arrived at Dakar in 1914, for example, the French administration established a separate African quarter. This was formalized by colonial urban planning as a permanent feature of the idea of the segregated city in the 1930s. The urban planner Toussaint formulates the principle at issue: 'between European Dakar and native Dakar we will establish an immense curtain composed of a great park.'\textsuperscript{13} Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) was strictly divided into European and Congolese sectors by a \textit{cordon sanitaire} of empty land. The aim was to restrict contamination of the former areas by African disease. Epidemic plague in the early part of the century caused the division of urban blacks from poor whites in Salisbury (now Harare) and their removal to a separate location. This developed into the government policy of residential segregation in

Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Soon after discovering outbreaks of the plague in both Johannesburg and Cape Town, African slums were razed and their inhabitants expelled to peripheral locations on sewage farms. These locations, materially and symbolically nauseating, later grew into permanent segregated townships at the city limits.

Fanon identifies the general mechanism centrally at work in each of these cases: 'The European city is not the prolongation of the native city. The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the natives. They have surrounded the native city; they have laid siege to it.' In the postwar years, active state intervention in urban development of Euro-American and colonial cities was encouraged, by means of agencies like nuisance law and zoning policy, to guarantee the most efficient ordering and use of resources. Thus, the principle of racialized urban segregation insinuated itself into the definition of postcolonial city space throughout 'the West', just as it continued to inform postindependence urban planning in Africa.\textsuperscript{14}

Accordingly, administration of racialized urban space throughout those societies identifying themselves as 'the West' began to reflect the divided cityscapes produced by colonial urban planning. The massive urban renewal and public housing programs in the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s started out explicitly as the exclusive concern for slum clearance. This concern is reflected in the titles of the bureaucracies directing the programs: In terms of the heralded Housing Act of 1949, urban renewal was to be administered by the Division of Slums and Urban Redevelopment; the country's largest urban program in New York City was originally headed by the Slum Clearance Commission and in Chicago by the Land Clearance Commission. The experience of the Philadelphia Housing Authority is typical. The federal Public Housing Authority rejected slum locations in the 1950s as the sites for (re)new(ed) public housing projects. However, they did little to generate available alternatives. Strong resistance to encroachment by white neighborhoods, a strict government unit-cost formula, shrinking federal slum clearance subsidies, and high land costs (caused in part by competition from private developers)\textsuperscript{15} left the Housing Authority with one realistic option: to develop multistory elevator towers on slum sites. The effects were twofold: on one hand, reproduction of inner city racial slums on a smaller but concentrated scale, but now visible to all; on the other, massive removal of the city's racial poor with no plan to rehouse them. Inner city ghettos were centralized and highly rationalized; the larger proportion of the racialized poor had to settle for slum conditions marginalized at the city limits. The first effect turned out to be nothing short of 'warehousing' the racially marginalized; the second, no less than 'Negro removal'.\textsuperscript{16}

This notion of 'slumliness' stamped the terms in and through which the urban space of the racially marginalized was (and in many ways still is) conceived and literally experienced by the Other's racial and class other, by those more or less white and to some degree middle class. The slum is by definition filthy, foul smelling, wretched, rancorous, uncultivated, and lacking care. The racial slum is
doubly determined, for the metaphorical stigma of a black blotch on the cityscape bears the added connotations of moral degeneracy, natural inferiority, and repulsiveness. It serves as an example of the spatial contradictions identified by Foucault's notion of heterotopia. The slum locates the lower class, the racial slum the underclass.17

Apartheid's Urban Areas

In terms of structural formation, then, the planning prototype of project housing and slum reproduction for the racially marginalized throughout those societies ideologically identified as 'the West', I want to suggest, is idealized in the Group Areas Act of the apartheid polis. This hypothesis will be considered by many to be purposely provocative and obviously overgeneralized; by others it may be thought trivially true. The standard assumption is that the racial experience of South Africa is unusual. My point here is to invert this presumption, to show just how deep a certain kind of experience of racial marginality runs in 'the West'. Nevertheless, to avoid misconception, I should specify what I do not mean by this suggestion.

First, I am emphatically not claiming that urban planners and government administrators outside of South Africa have necessarily had apartheid-like intentions. Indeed, though there may have been exceptions at the extreme, motives seem to have been mixed, and expressed primary intentions in the public domain appear mostly to have been to integrate neighborhoods along class lines. Second, the planning effects under consideration in 'the West' have not been formalized or instituted with anything closely resembling the precision of the South African state; urban movement, racial displacement, and segregated space outside of South Africa have more often been situated as the outcomes of privatized preferences and positioned as responses to the 'informalities' of market forces.18 Third, I do not mean to suggest that project housing (or ghettoization, for that matter) ever was or now is considered a single residential solution to 'the Negro problem' or to 'the problem of the underclass'. Fourth, and most emphatically, my aim is not to exonerate apartheid morally by normalizing it, that is, by rendering it in terms analogous to common (and so seemingly acceptable) practice in Europe and North America. Rather, I am concerned in invoking the comparison to condemn segregation wherever it manifests by calling attention to the practice of reinventing ghettos (whether formally or informally) and its peripheral dislocation—and thus reproduction—of the racially marginalized. The implication I intend here is that repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1990 and other cornerstones of formal apartheid will leave urban space in South Africa emulating the sort of racialized location 'West-wide' for which I am claiming, apartheid has offered a model. Finally, I am not claiming that all elements of the apartheid idea

Pragmatics of Segregated Space

The key structural features of the Group Areas Act of 1950 that I wish to emphasize here include:

a. A residential race zone or area for each racial group;

b. Strong physical boundaries or imagined barriers to serve as buffers between racial residential zones. These barriers may be natural, like a river or valley, or human constructions, like a park, railway line, or highway;

c. Each racial group should have direct access to work areas (industrial sites or central business district), where racial interaction is necessary, or to common amenities (like government bureaucracies, airports, sport stadiums) without having to enter the residential zone of another racial group. Where economies in furnishing such common access necessitate traversing the racial space of others, it should be by 'neutral' and buffered means like railways or highways;

d. Industry should be dispersed in ribbon formation around the city's periphery, rather than amassed in great blocks, to give maximal direct access at minimal transportation costs;

e. The central business district is to remain under white control.

'Racial groups' in (a) are most widely interpreted as being constituted by 'whites' and 'blacks'. But, as we have seen, the informal extension of 'black' differs widely. For example, in Britain it has included Asians, while in the United States it excludes Hispanics. This simply underlines what I have been insisting upon, namely, that race is fabricated. In keeping with my usage above, I will qualify 'racial group' in this context in terms of class position. A racial group will acquire specificity as a class or class fraction that has come to be conceived in racialized terms; a class or class fraction, by extension, is partially set by way of its racialized delimitation. So those subjected to project housing and ghettoization are defined here as the 'racially marginalized'.

Examples of physical boundaries or imagined buffers, (b), abound. Harlem is divided from southwest Manhattan by Central Park and Morningside Park, as well as by double-lane, two-way-traffic cross-streets (110th and 125th streets; most east-west streets in Manhattan are one-way). The South Bronx is divided from...
Likewise inverted (and indeed fundamentally transformed by) the apartheid urban order, a racialized city space is being produced, circumscripted and patrolled with a new logic. The strong buffer zones of apartheid urban order ideally make spatial allowance for each racial residential zone to expand. In the urban metropolises where the residential space problem emerged and where space is at a (costly) premium, this ideal has not been an option. It is replaced, in the scheme of things, by a testy area of racially overlapping, common class residential integration (as, say, in South Philadelphia). Examples of neutralized transversal routes across the residential space of the racial Other, item (c), include the West Side Highway and the East River Drive along the sides of Manhattan, the I-95 and Schuykill expressways in Philadelphia, Chicago's Lake Shore Drive, and the system of transversal routes cutting across Los Angeles County (the San Diego Freeway, I-10, the Long Beach, Santa Ana, and Pasadena freeways). Johannesburg provides an interesting inversion of this latter principle: Three highway ring roads circumscribe the city as a form of laager defense against 'alien' invasion. The motto here, formerly 'lest native restlessness spill over', has been silently recast in postapartheid terms as 'lest the underclass externalize its frustrations'. This racialized containment maximizes as it imparts new significance to the (socioracial) control over what Foucault identifies as the 'three great variables of urban design and spatial organization': communication, speed, and territory.

With the informalizing of racialized exclusions, organization and control of racial space in postapartheid South Africa is becoming increasingly complex. Central Johannesburg, to take just one example, has quickly transformed into a city inhabited by black South Africans, into what many descriptively or disparagingly refer to as 'a black city'. The instigation of this process much as they had done two decades earlier in Detroit, by fleeing first for the suburbs and then for Cape Town, where for historical reasons the presence of black people seems dramatically diminished. One might refer to this as 'normalizing racism' in the face of 'ending apartheid'. Racialized exclusion is being deepened by the informalities of private preference schemes. It is, as elsewhere, being rendered the (in)advertent outcome of private choice and informal market mechanisms. The state simply facilitates this privatizing process. For example, the pending Residential Environmental Bill seeks to maintain 'norms and standards in residential environments' and to curb community disputes, disturbances, and physical or offensive nuisances. Power is ceded to residents, local authorities, and to a board with wide-ranging powers to be appointed by a cabinet minister. Effective control thus remains in the hands of whites. The aim of the law is to furnish the state, its agents, and those it represents with the power, first, to contain the dramatic spread of informal, shantytown residential space by black urbanizing poor and second, to maintain and manage the boundaries of rigidly racialized neighborhood space within urban settings. Thus, the law enables owners of an apartment building to establish a bylaw restricting residence in the entire building to families, no more than two children and no less than an established income level, and on resident agreement. Blacks in South Africa tend to have significantly larger families and lower incomes than whites.

In seeking to privatize the choice of and control over defining racialized urban space, South Africa seems to be invoking a long-standing principle of racially exclusionary relations. When formally sanctioned exclusions are no longer politically possible, private preferences to exclude may be sustained under more generally acceptable principles like freedom of expression, or association, or uncoercing property contracts dictated by free market forces. For example, when racial zoning was rendered unconstitutional in the United States, some property owners and real estate developers entered privately into what became known as 'racial covenants'. The agreements restricted sale or leasing black of property in specified areas for stated periods of time. They were used not only to prevent blacks from moving into a neighborhood but spatially to ring black ghetto areas so as to prevent their street-by-street expansion. While judicial enforcement of the covenant was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1948, it was not until 1972 that the recording of racially restrictive covenants was rendered illicit. Thus, prior to 1972 such agreements had to undergo the effort and expense of a legal challenge in order to render them unenforceable. Their widespread influence on racialized urban spatial arrangements was as effective at the time as the juridical limitation of racism to intentional discrimination is proving for exclusionary employment practices now.

The illustrations of (b) and (c) are not meant to imply that city parks, highways, or reservoirs in the United States developed for the purpose of dividing urban space along racial lines or to deny that (racialized) communities have their own internal logics of formation. The historical determinations of urban structure are multiple and complex. But once in place, these urban facilities were explicitly used or, at the very least, facilitated physically relying the symbolic divides of racialized city space.
In terms of (d), the placement of industry and employment, the suburbanization of capital in the 1970s further ‘whitened’ the work force as travel costs and time proved prohibitive for inner city blacks. The reversal generated by gentrification, as I noted earlier, has doubly displaced blacks, whether formally or informally. The drive to settle the central business district residentially, (e), is class-determined. Displaced from inner city living space, the racially marginalized are removed once more from easy urban access to a workplace. It is, as Duncan and Mindlin bear witness, costly to be poor and more costly in almost every way for black poor than for white poor.24

The living space of poverty is best described in terms of confinement: cramped bedrooms sleeping several people, sleeping space serving as daytime living rooms, kitchens doubling as bathrooms, oftentimes as bedrooms. The segregated space of formalized racism is overdetermined. Not only is private space restricted (if not completely unveiled) by the constraints of poverty, so too is public institutional space, and purposely so: cramped corners of upper galleries in movie theaters and court houses, the back seats of buses or minibus taxis, overcrowded classrooms, emergency rooms, and prison facilities. The restriction of formalized racism has done little to alter most of these conditions for the racially marginalized. Indeed, the privatization of racism, the continuance of informal racist expression, may have done much: to extend confined conditions in the inner cities. Moreover, shopping malls and large discount supermarkets are invariably placed at locations convenient to white middle-class residential space or in the relatively ‘safe’ central business district. Thus, the racially marginalized may be drawn at some inconvenience and increased expense to seek out such shopping sites. Whites, of course, are almost never drawn to shop in racial ghettoes, in what are invariably perceived as ‘slums’. In this, inner city racial space bears uncomfortable affinities with urban space in apartheid and postapartheid South Africa.25 It is difficult to imagine how this racialization of space would differ in the ‘new South Africa’. Consider only the fact that all concern to date has focused on how upwardly mobile blacks might penetrate what effectively remains white residential space. Nobody has raised the question, perhaps for obvious reasons, of a reverse or counterflow.

In every case the construct of separate (racial) group areas, in design or effect, has served to constrain, restrict, monitor, and regulate urban space and in experience. The spatial economy thus constituted along racial lines determines a discipline, a type of power or technology, that traverses every kind of apparatus or institution, linking them, prolonging them, and making them converge and function in a new way.26 Apartheid circumscribes township ‘locations’ with barbed wire fences and entry checkpoints. Racialized urban sites throughout Europe and the United States are distanced, physically or symbolically, in the master plan of city space.

Projects and Peripherical Space

Social Pathologies and City Projects

The sort of similitude I have identified here between the southern tip of Africa and the northwestern hemisphere reveals issues that otherwise remain obscure. Spatial control is not simply a reaction to natural divisions and social pathologies in the urban population but is constitutive of them. So certain types of activity are criminalized—hence conceived as pathological or deviant—due to their geographic concentration in the city. Because of statistical variations in location, ‘other kinds of crime are either not important, not widespread, or not harmful, and thus not really crimes at all’.27 This localization of crime serves a double end: It magnifies the image of racialized criminality, and it confines the overwhelming proportion of crimes involving the racially marginalized to racially marginal space.28 Spatial constraints, after all, are limitations on the people inhabiting that space. These delimitations extend discipline over inhabitants and visitors by monitoring them without having to bother about the intraspatial disciplinary relations between them. Nevertheless, as the example of Johannesburg ring roads suggests, this mode of controlling racialized urban locations presupposes a repressive source of disciplinary self-control and self-surveillance set in order by those in power. In watching over others not only are these Others forced to watch themselves, but the Masters (and Madams) limit and locate their own set of liberties. In the emerging spatial economy of postapartheid South Africa, for example, the depth of paranoia among upper-middle-class whites is reflected in the high prisonlike walls swallowing up the houses they seek to hide, in the perspicuous burglar bars, very public displays of sophisticated alarm systems, and vicious guard dogs trained to react only to the passing presence of blacks. The prevalence of theft as a coping mechanism for extreme racialized poverty and as a sign of the breakdown of (whites’ obsession with) ‘law and order’ is coded in white public consciousness—in the endless cocktail hour reports of such ‘incidents’—as something ‘they’ (blacks) do. South Central Los Angeles, it seems, is but a metaphorical stone’s throw away from suburban South Africa.

The racialized image of urban squalor is taken to pollute the picture we are supposed to have of the body politic by reflecting itself in terms of other social pathologies like crime, drug abuse, prostitution, and now AIDS. The poverty of the inner city infrastructure provides a racial sign of complex social disorders, of their manifestation when in fact it is their cause. The idea of project housing has accordingly come to stand throughout ‘the West’ as the central mark of racially constituted urban pathology. Tower projects assumed high visibility as the housing solution to a set of bureaucratic problems: lack of vacant sites at the urban periphery, unaffordable center city plot costs, and overwhelming low income...
demand for decent housing. These economic considerations were complemented by strong social reaction on the part of neighborhoods even to low density public housing infiltration. The high rise project resolved bureaucratic concerns that assumed both economic and social form by building low cost, high density buildings in slum areas where resources and morale have traditionally tended to limit resident reaction.

It is with the idea of high rise project housing, however, that I am primarily concerned. The racially marginalized are isolated within center city space, enclosed within single entrance/exit elevator buildings, and carefully divided from respectably residential urban areas by highway, park, playing field, vacant lot, or railway line: Hulme in Manchester, the Bijlmermeer project outside Amsterdam, Federal Street in Chicago, Jacob Riis in New York, the Baltimore project at the margins of the very popular Harbor Place development, Southwark Plaza in Philadelphia, and the various projects for ‘Coloureds’ scattered around Cape Town—Manenberg, Hanover Park, and Ocean View, which barely lives up to its name. In the extremity of their conditions, the inwardsness of their spatial design, their relative spatial dislocation, and their alienating effects, the Cape Town projects provide something of a prototype. They also serve as a perpetual reminder of the racialized grounds of projects’ formations. The projects present a generic image without identity: the place of crime; of social disorder, dirt and disease; of teenage pregnancy, prostitution, pimps, and drug dependency; the workless and shiftless, disciplined internally if at all only by social welfare workers. The marginal are centralized in this faceless space, peripheral at the social center.

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The project is conceptually precise: a plan to place (a representative population) so that it protrudes or sticks out. The economies of condensed Bauhaus brick or concrete are visible from all sides. Project housing, then, is in more than its economic sense public: ‘We’ always know where the project is, if only to avoid it; and while familiar with the façade, ‘we’ can extend our ignorance of the personal identities of its inhabitants. Its external visibility serves at once as a form of panoptical discipline, vigilant boundary constraints upon its effects that might spill over to threaten the social fabric.

The thrust of this argument applies equally to the construction of Chinatowns as an idea and a location in ‘occidental’ urban space. Kay Anderson has shown that the formation of Chinatown as an identifiable and contained place is Vancouver—and the same must go for San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, London, or the Latin Quarter in Paris—is likewise a function of that set of historical categories constituting the idea of the project: idealized racial typifications tied to notions of slumliness, physical and ideological pollution of the body politic, sanitation and health syndromes, lawlessness, addiction, and prostitution.3 Chinatown is at once of the city but distanced from it, geographically central but spatially marginal.

The idea of project housing is in principle periphrastic for it contrasts sharply with the prevailing norm and surrounding practice of housing throughout the extension of ‘the West’. This norm and the practices it generates are best characterized as possessive individualist home ownership. This sensibility is well-expressed by Frank Capra’s characters in It’s a Wonderful Life:

George Bailey to his father: Oh well, you know what I’ve always talked about—build things ... design new buildings—plan modern cities...

Pop: You know, George, I feel that in a small way we are doing something important. Satisfying a fundamental urge. It’s deep in the race for a man to want his roof and walls and fireplace.

Home is a place of peace, of shelter from terror, doubt, and division, a geography of relative self-determination and sanctity. Lacking control over housing and common conditions, lacking the recognizable conditions of homelessness, tenant commitment to the neglected and confined rental space of the project is understandably negligible. By contrast, enjoying relative autonomy over private property and the benefits of tax incentives, homeowner resentment to the permanence of project housing is fierce. A preferred bureaucratic solution repeats another structural feature of apartheid: Recourse to perpetual removal and turnover of the project population prevents incubation of solidarity and a culture of resistance.

At the extreme, whole groups or neighborhoods may be moved or removed, as in the destruction in South Africa of Sophiatown (a Johannesburg shantytown and vibrant cultural enclave in the 1940s and early 1950s), Cato Manor (the Indian equivalent in Durban), and District Six (a thriving Cape Town inner city ‘Coloured’ and Muslim neighborhood), or ultimately in the gentrification of a project. Sophiatown, Cato Manor, and District Six were destroyed by the state because they stood as living expressions of cultural resistance. On a more practical level, all three were densely populated and organically formed. Thus, management of everyday life was far more difficult to order than it is when subjected to the grid geometry of the townships to which their inhabitants were relocated.

Similarly, and in keeping with the logic of privatized exclusion, there has been real estate talk in Philadelphia of turning Southwark Plaza housing project into a home for the aged to sustain spiraling property values due to gentrification in the adjacent Queen’s Village or to temper falling values in an economic downturn.

It should come as little surprise that urban housing administration in ‘the West’, and the idea of the housing project in particular, reproduces central structural features of the expression of Group Areas. I have been arguing that despite local variations and specificities, a common (transpatial) history of racist expression proscribes the range of acceptable city planning for the racially marginalized and circumscribes the effects of such plans. Against the background of the discursive link of apartheid to the history of Eueracist, the Group Areas Act is not only not foreign to the Eurocentric Weltanschauung but, with the optimal set of social
conditions for a racialized social formation, to be expected as the norm. And South Africa has furnished nothing if not the idealized conditions for the reproduction of racism.

Degeneration and Gentrification

I noted earlier that this extended analogy between the informal affects of implicitly racialized urban housing policy throughout 'the West' and the Group Areas Act is implied in a set of terms common to historical and present-day racist expression: pollution, sanitation, purity and cleanliness, degeneration and gentrification. It is not that these terms bear the same connotation whenever and wherever they have occurred. It is precisely because of their conceptual generality, malleability, and parasitism that they have managed both to reflect prevailing social discourse at a specific time and place and to stamp that discourse with their significance.

Degeneration appears to be the binding principle here, at work even if only implicitly. In the nineteenth century, the concept was central to fundamental discourses of collective identity and identification. It found expression in biology, including evolutionary theory, in sociology, criminology, economic and psychiatric theory, in discourses defining sex, nation, and race. Herbert Spencer most clearly expressed the key idea: In sex and society, biology and race, in economic and national terms, physical, mental, and social defects 'arrest the increase of the best; . . . deteriorate their constitutions, and . . . pull them down towards the level of the worst'. The racial assumptions presupposed decay, the extent of which was defined by racial type. Races accordingly have their proper or natural places, geographically and biologically. Displaced from their proper or normal class, national, or ethnic positions in the social and ultimately urban setting, a 'Native' or 'Negro' would generate pathologies—slums, criminality, poverty, alcoholism, prostitution, disease, insanity—that if allowed to transgress the social norms would pollute the (white) body politic and at the extreme bring about racial extinction. Degeneracy, then, is the mark of a pathological Other, an Other both marked by and standing as the central sign of disorder. Stratified by race and class, the modern city becomes the testing ground of survival, of racialized power and control: The paranoia of losing power assumes the image of becoming Other, to be avoided like the plague.

These assumptions are apparent in the popular rhetoric surrounding public housing, for example. Article in 1958 about the 'public housing jungle' characterized tenants of a New York City project in the language of the Primitive, 'deprived of the normal quota of human talent needed for self-discipline and self-improvement ...

a living catastrophe ... [breeding] social ills and requiring endless outside assistance'. The comparison between the 'respectability, diligence and moral superiority of [white] homeowners' and the 'disreputableness, slothfulness, and property-endangering' tenants of [black] projects is often repeated: from Philadelphia public hearings on project housing in 1956 to the American apartheid of Yonkers, circa 1988, and the contemporary media characterization of the 'Underclass'.

If degeneration is the dark, regressive side of progress, then 'regeneration' is the reformation—the spiritual and physical renewal—but only of those by nature fit for it. And gentrification is the form of regeneration which most readily defines the postmodern city. Gentrification is a structural phenomenon tied to changing forms of capital accumulation and the means of maximizing ground rent. It involves tax-assisted displacement of longterm inner city resident poor (usually the racially marginalized), renovation of the vacated residential space, upscaling the neighborhood, and resettling the area with inhabitants of higher socioeconomic status. The structural changes occur not only on the ground, so to speak, but in terms of capital formation (capital is shifted from less profitable yet possibly productive sectors into real estate) as well as in terms of labor formation and relations in the city (shifts from productive to service workers and from blue collar to white collar positions).

Obviously, the implications of gentrification may vary from one inner city sector to another. If project residents are naturally slothful and dangerous, if these are their natural states, then the imperatives of gentrification demand not merely project containment but its total transformation, together with the ultimate displacement of the residents. This is the extreme form of the Group Areas Act. Sophiatown was redeveloped into a suburb occupied largely by white members of the South African police force and triumphantly renamed 'Triompf'. Cato Manor was until recently largely laid bare. Parts of District Six, like other areas reclassified as white residential space, have been gentrified by white real estate developers who have remodeled the dilapidated, multiresident houses into single-family Chelsea-style cottages. Similarly, single room occupancies in Philadelphia's Center City were redeveloped under a tax abatement scheme into 'elegant' townhouses, just as they were converted in Manhattan into 'desirable' studio apartments. With the repeal of the Group Areas Act in South Africa, gentrification will likely be available to a proportion of the black population no larger than it has been in the urban centers of the United States. By contrast, the exoticism of Chinatown's marginality may be packaged as a tourist attraction and potential urban tax base. Thus, urban revenue requirements—fiscal costs and benefits—combine with lingering racist language to determine the fates of urban dwellers: Expenditures and the discourse of pollution and decay demand displacement and exclusion in the first instance; revenue enhancement, the discourse of exoticism, and exclusivity prompt urban renewal and 'beautification' in the second.
The Power of Place

We now live the postmodern condition mostly in polarized cities, atomized ethnic neighborhoods and racial locations divided 'naturally' from each other. The sprawling pockets of racialized poverty are contained, but for the growing holes of homelessness that spill forth a future we would rather not face. It is in virtue of the kind of notions I have outlined here and the superficially neutral surface expressions to which they give rise—most recently, 'the underclass'—that members of 'pure' groups are distinguished from the 'impure', the 'diseased' and 'different' are differentiated from the 'clean' or 'clean cut' and 'acceptable', the 'normal' set apart from the 'abnormal', the included divided from the excluded. Covert readaptations of these concepts continue to provide criteria and rationalizations for differential inclusion in the body politic—for the right to (express) power, for urban location and displacement in the process of gentrification—and in the differentiation of urban services. In this resurrection of segregated city space, in these 'imagined geographies',37 the expressive content of racialized discourse and racial terms are invented anew.

This extended spatial affinity between 'the West' and the apartheid polis is also reflected in the simulacrum of racialized iconographies of resistance and reaction in the United States and South Africa, in the particularities of South Central Los Angeles and Soweto. Far from 'senseless', the horrifying phenomena of 'necklacing' in the political lexicon of South African township symbolism assumed significance, if not justification, by emulating the act of placing the mayoral chain around the neck of governmental collaborators. Setting alight the rubber tire was akin, then, to melting the chain of collaboration, to wiping away the symbol of white authority, as at once reduced to human ashes the body mayoral chain around the neck of governmental collaborators. Setting alight the rubber tire was akin, then, to melting the chain of collaboration, to wiping away the symbol of white authority, as it at once reduced to human ashes the body in whose collaboration authority was vested. In Los Angeles, the torching of buildings and businesses, not quite randomly, also seemed to reflect a rage against a class-defined collaboration in perpetuating the subjugation of the racially marginalized. In the delirium of the momentary, the innocence of homeliness was completely denied. Recasting the terms of the moral in the postmodern fashion of fading away with no regard for the consumptive effects upon people. And finally, that contrast between home ownership and project dwelling was instantly laid bare. Liquor stores were trashed not simply in a drug-crazed drive to feed a habit but as in South African township uprisings nearly a decade earlier, because they so clearly represent the spirit of surplus value soaked in degradation, the pursuit of profit with no regard for the consumptive effects upon people. And finally, that vicious beating of a defenseless white truck driver by young black men, overlooked from afar by inactive officers of the peace, was frozen in the media representation as a photographic negative of Rodney King's brutal beating at the hands of white policemen. Both images boosted the power to transgress, to be outside the law. The latter image was boosted beyond belief by the policemen's acquittal; the former was mediated, in contrast, by the distance of helicopter reporters, whose journalistic objectivity prevented any intervention in the deadly event, just as this and a second attack on a truck driver at the same intersection were mitigated only by the largely unreported fact that both truck drivers had escaped death by being escorted through the mob by young black men and women at considerable risk to their own safety. Unbridled anarchy is the ultimate price of acquittal in the court of injustice. The formal lawlessness, the ungovernability of and loss of control over apartheid's racially marginalized townships reveal the inherently political dimensions to racial configuration. In this sense, race is more than simply the site of stratification, for the latter merely presupposes the establishment of levels of socioeconomic being. The politics of racial identity and identification constitute rather the sphere(s) of subjection and subjugation, the spaces in and through which are created differences, gradations, and degradations. By extension, they become the spaces from which resistance and transformation are to be launched.

Coincidentally, this account highlights one reason, often overlooked, why public policy in nation-states taking themselves to be of 'the West' has been so readily complicit with the reproduction and renewal of apartheid. Distance is not, at least not primarily, to be interpreted spatially or geographically but in terms of difference—and so in terms of the reinvented articulation of racist concepts. 'Generative metaphors' of sameness and otherness rule spatial relations. Consider the spatial image of civic duty inherited from modernist morals:

I am a [a] pebble, the world is the pond I have been dropped into. I am at the center of a system of concentric circles that become fainter as they spread. The first circle immediately around me is strong, and each successive circle is weaker. My duties are exactly like the concentric circles around the pebble: strongest at the center and rapidly diminishing toward the periphery. My primary duties are to those immediately around me, my secondary duties are to those next nearest, my tertiary duties to those next, and so on. Plainly, any duties to those on the far periphery are going to diminish to nothing, and given the limited resources available to any ordinary person, her positive duties will barely reach beyond a second or third circle. This geographically based ranking of the priority of duties seems so obviously correct to many people that it is difficult for them to take criticisms of it seriously.38

Center and periphery need not be literally located: White South Africa may be part of the (implicit) interpretation of center, the racially marginalized United States part of the periphery; Japanese once at the outer limit now seem to be more centrally—if ambivalently and ambiguously—placed. Distance and diminishing duties are inversely proportional to a common history and culture, as well as to the interests they define. Universal norms are circumstantially qualified and so delimited in terms of the racialized metaphors that are insinuated into the historical formation and reproduction of spatial differences. In racializing part of the population, the autonomy of the group thus 'othered' is mediated, if not completely denied. Recasting the terms of the moral in the postmodern fashion of
community, tradition, and localized particular may serve here solely to magnify the racially exclusionary effects.

The racialized postmodern city differs from its modernist counterpart in that we have embraced its atomized spaces,39 that we have become habituated to the recurrent removals, displacements, bounded racial and ethnic territories, and that we have become chained to and by home ownership and its vacating implication of homelessness. It is not just that the limits of our language limit our thoughts; the world we find ourselves in is one we have helped to create, and this places constraints upon how we think the world anew. That we continue to imagine and reproduce the racially marginalized in terms of shiftlessness, laziness, irrationality, incapacity, and dependence preclude important policy options from consideration, literally from being thought. Homesteading has been successfully practiced on a small scale in various urban communities (for example, in Northwood, Baltimore), though its successes have largely been limited to the middle class and there has been no attempt to generalize the undertaking. Modest plans in Palm Beach County, Florida, to desegregate school districts by attracting black families to acquire local housing are being criticized by some realtors for encouraging racial steering, the illegal practice of directing racially identified home seekers to particular neighborhoods. Though such modestly imaginative attempts to overcome the effects of historically discriminatory housing and schooling practices are already constrained by the presumption of ‘integrating minorities into a dominant status quo’, they are nevertheless being cynically forestalled in the name of principles or laws designed to delimit discrimination. Here, as elsewhere, the law’s necessary commitment to general principles, to abstract universal rules, to develop objective laws through universalization, is at once exclusive of subjectivities, identities, and particularities. It is exclusive, in other words, of people’s very being, ensnaring history—both one’s own and others’. So when the law in its application and interpretation invokes history the reading is likely to be very partial, the more so the more politicized the process becomes. And race, I am insisting, necessarily politicizes the processes it brackets and colors. In its claim to universality and objectivity, the law effaces the being of legal agents, of principals and their principles. It effaces agency itself and so veils different agents’ pleasures and sufferings, which are often causally, if silently linked. In commanding anonymously, the law hides those in and issuing command, just as it denies the violence it may perpetrate upon those commanded.

The only satisfactory response that seems available to this dilemma of the legal and moral domains, to the dilemma of sameness and difference, universality and particularity, is to insist that moral expression intersect pragmatically with political, metaphysical, and cultural contestation. This is a point I will return to elaborate as the central claim of my conclusion.

That the State in the name of its citizenry insists on overseeing—policing—the precise and detailed forms that housing must take for the poor and racialized suggests that we really are committed to the kinds of disciplinary culture that