Medieval Modernity: On Citizenship and Urbanism in a Global Era

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Abstract. This paper examines forms of citizenship associated with contemporary urbanism. Focusing on three paradigmatic spaces: the gated enclave, the regulated squatter settlement and the camp, the authors argue that the landscape of urban citizenship is increasingly fragmented and divided. These geographies are constituted through multiple and competing sovereignties which, when territorially exercised, produce fiefdoms of regulation or zones of ‘no-law’. In order to understand these practices, the authors employ the conceptual framework of the ‘medieval city’. This use of history as theory sheds light on particular types of urban citizenship, such as the ‘free town’ or the ‘ethnic quarter’, that were present at different moments of medievalism and that are congruent with current processes. The ‘medieval’ is invoked not as an historical period, but rather as a transhistorical analytical category that interrogates the modern at this moment of liberal empire.

Introduction

The new century has been inaugurated through a revival of interest in cities. There is the sheer fact that the 21st century will be an urban century, with more people living in cities than in any other spatial formation. There is an anxiety that much of this urbanisation will take place in the cities of the global South, cities that have for a while now been framed as places of hyper-growth. Beyond the demographic hyperbole, there is also the argument that cities are the key sites at which contemporary global capitalism is managed and controlled. The ‘global city’ theorists (Sassen, 1991) depict an ecology of globalisation1 that is essentially a hierarchy of cities and that can be read either as a Darwinian argument about the ‘survival of the fittest’ or as a Durkheimian analysis of a division of labour. Whether or not

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one subscribes to such ecological mappings of globalisation, the theme persists: despite the talk of deterritorialisation, cities and their territories matter.

But there is considerable disagreement on how to interpret today’s urban landscape. On the one hand, an optimistic discourse envisions cities as arenas of livability, livelihood and social transformation (Friedmann and Douglass, 1998; Evans, 2002). In settings like Latin America, there is the sense that the decentralisation of governance from national to urban scales involves the ‘quiet revolution’ of democracy (Campbell, 2003). In the US, there is an enduring hope that urban politics can counter the chauvinisms of national regimes, as in the attempts by many cities, such as San Francisco, to legalise gay marriage, often against the dictates of state or federal governments. On the other hand, a critical discourse sees emerging forms of urban citizenship as fragmented and splintered, constituted through gated enclaves and exclusionary spaces (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Democracy, in Yiftachel and Yakobi’s (2004) provocative theorisation, comes to be territorialised in an ‘urban ethnocracy’, a form of governance marked by deep racial and ethnic divisions. Or, scholars tracking the rise of neo-liberalism, the free market ideologies that took hold in the 1980s, draw attention to how the entrepreneurial redevelopment of cities (Harvey, 2000) is accompanied by a set of vicious policies that speed up the displacement of the urban poor (Smith, 1996; Mitchell, 2003). If San Francisco epitomises an urban regime of citizenship that ‘civilises’ and ‘liberalises’ national citizenship, then it also epitomises a set of mean and aggressive ‘neo-liberal’ urban policies that seek to criminalise homelessness in the name of urban development.

How should we begin to sort through these starkly different interpretations of cities and citizenship?2 Does one discourse trump the other? Or are they describing very different processes? It is obvious that the competing narratives indicate different theoretical approaches. But there is also something else: the stubborn paradoxes of urban citizenship amplified by the paradoxes of contemporary globalisation. For example, the recent research of Perlman (2004) on the favelas of Rio de Janeiro shows how democratisation can go hand-in-hand with deepening inequalities and how infrastructural improvements can exist alongside the brutal violences of the international drug trade and of the state apparatus. Or, Rothman’s (2003) analysis of Las Vegas indicates how urban policies regarding public space are shaped in relation to the idea of freedom, but that the notion of freedom itself is cast as ‘freedom from’ (freedom from the presence of the urban poor, freedom from protests) or as a ‘freedom to consume’. There is therefore an inherent doubleness to the idea of freedom and this comes to be territorialised in the realm of urban citizenship.

In this paper, we argue that the current discussion of cities and citizenship can be usefully approached through an invocation of medieval urbanism as a conceptual framework. The medieval city reminds us that the relationship between cities and globalisation is not new. If today the global city is imagined as the command and centre node of international trade, then the medieval city can also be cast as a global city. Be it Pirenne’s (1925, p. 217) argument that the economic renaissance of the 12th century led to the formation of ‘free towns’, or Mumford’s (1961, p. 255) precisely opposite argument that it was the revival of the ‘protected town’ that helped the reopening of international trade routes, the relationship between medieval city and global trade is incontrovertible. But perhaps more importantly, the medieval city reminds us of the paradoxes, exclusions and segmentations that have always been associated with city form and urban organisation. Thus, Pirenne
refers to the medieval city as a ‘free town’, while Mumford refers to it as a ‘protected town’. In other words, the medieval free town was also the protected town; there was no medieval concept of freedom that was not also a concept of association, patronage and defence.

This ‘doubleness’ is a valuable analytical tool for examining contemporary urban geographies. In the sections that follow, we highlight three distinctive spatial formations: the gated enclave, the squatter settlement and the camp, showing how modalities of medieval urbanism make possible an understanding of the paradoxes and potentials of these spaces. Our emphasis is on three points of congruence between medieval and contemporary cities. First, if modern citizenship was constituted through a set of abstract individual rights embedded in the concept of the nation-state, then now there is the emergence of forms of citizenship that are located in urban enclaves. As in medieval times, this citizenship is linked to either patronage (as in the bishop) or to associational membership (as in the guild) and in both cases it is fundamentally about protection. Secondly, such forms of citizenship substitute for or are even hostile to the state. From the private home-owners’ associations to the neighbourhood-level Islamic republics being declared by religious fundamentalist groups, these are private systems of governance that operate as medieval fiefdoms, imposing truths and norms that are often contrary to national law. Thirdly, this logic of rule has territorial manifestations. The city comes to be articulated in what Holston and Appadurai (1999, p. 13) have termed a “honeycomb of jurisdictions”, a “medieval body” of “overlapping, heterogeneous, nonuniform, and increasingly private memberships”.

It is important to note that, in deploying the analytical category of the medieval city, we do not imply that medievalism is a consistent historical period or a unified and uniform geography. While we do not focus on the different geographies of the medieval city, we nevertheless argue that the temporal and spatial diversity of the medieval city adds to rather than detracts from our analytical enterprise. For example, one debate about medieval cities is the purported difference between European and Middle Eastern contexts. Kostof (1985, pp. 369–370), using von Grunebaum’s (1955) classic orientalist text, argues that the ‘Islamic’ medieval city lacked the forms of self-governance and municipal organisation evident in European medieval cities. He interprets medieval Cairo with its “solidly built mass” and “maze of dead-end alleys” as lacking a public domain. In contrast, he finds in cities like Florence a battle “to take control of its streets and open spaces . . . to conceive of the city-form as an intentional design . . . and perceivable order” (Kostof, 1985, p. 371). In other words, the disorderly Islamic city was a trope that made possible the norm of the ordered European city. Such a distinction between chaotic and mysterious Islamic medieval cities and functionally ordered European medieval cities resonates with the distinction drawn today between ungovernable Third World cities and governed First World cities. It is a distinction that has been challenged with regard to medieval cities, with urban theorists arguing that what is at stake is different logics of regulation and management rather than the presence or absence of governance (AlSayyad, 1991). It is a distinction that is obviously challenged with regard to contemporary cities as well (Robinson, 2002).

The medieval city stretches out over many centuries. Rather than searching for a coherent medieval urbanism, we pay careful attention to the different temporalities and forms of the medieval city and argue that this diversity provides useful purchase on urban transitions and transformations. The time-line of
medieval urbanism can be distilled thus. With the end of Roman Empire, the cities of antiquity declined. In the early middle ages, in the 9th and 10th centuries, the city survives as an episcopal city ruled by bishops (Pirenne, 1925). The 11th and 12th centuries witness a revival of cities as centres of international trade and economic transactions and, more broadly, in Braudel’s (1979, p. 512) terms as “outposts of modernity”, a “collection of rules, possibilities, calculations”. These cities embodied a contestation over sovereignty, not only in the multiple sovereignties that marked the political economy of medievalism, but also in the attempt of cities to become “states within the state” (Pirenne, 1925, p. 228). By the 18th century, this struggle had been resolved in favour of a political framework of baroque centralism embodied in a national state where the privileges of citizenship were obtained not from the city but from the prince and could be exercised anywhere in the royal realm (Mumford, 1961, p. 355).

We plot contemporary urban spaces in relation to these historical moments. Mumford (1961, p. 261) argues that the 18th-century myth of the social contract, which persists as an idea of national citizenship well into the 20th century, was a “rationalisation of the political basis of the medieval town”. Is it possible then to see the dissolution of national citizenship, its fragmentation and localisation and decentralisation at the urban scale, as a return to what Mumford (1961, p. 347) calls “medieval localism”? Are the gated enclaves of contemporary urbanism similar to medieval city-states “buttressed with privileges, acquired or extorted” (Braudel, 1979, p. 512)? Can today’s splintering urbanism be seen as similar to the city of the late middle ages? If we go further back in time, we find in the early middle ages, the city of the bishop, the city where, as Pirenne (1925, p. 65) reminds us the idea of citizenship, of civitas, was synonymous with religious rule and where the bishop wielded policing and administrative powers. The parallel in the Islamic world is also relevant here: whether it was the city of the caliphs or the city of the sultan, the ‘Islamic city’ was the predominant mode of urban existence (AlSayyad, 1991). Are the religious regimes of rule at work in the informal spaces of contemporary cities reminiscent of the medieval religious city?

And if we go yet further back in time, we are faced with the end of empire and the disbanding of urban citizenship and of the city. Is this a moment that bears similarity to our present moment, one at which as Agamben (1995, p. 181) has noted, it is “not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm”? As the Roman Empire waned, the public life of the city of Rome centred more and more on “rituals of extermination”, reaching their climax in the gladiatorial spectacles, “death in the afternoon”, dramatised as a circus (Mumford, 1961, p. 227). Today, cities seek to deploy the strategy of spectacle in crafting a public life; some like Las Vegas claim to be the greatest show on earth as Rome once was the greatest show on earth. But the show is also morphing into a “death in the afternoon”—Agamben’s (1995) “bare life” rendered as spectacle, brought to us live on CNN and Al-Jazeera. Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, p. 328) draw attention to the magicality of the state in the age of millennial capitalism, the ritual excess that stands as an alibi for realpolitik. At a moment of empire, the ritual excess takes shape in the form of rituals of extermination displayed as hyper-reality. Or is this the spectacle that marks the waning of empire?

It should be apparent by now that our use of the medieval time-line operates in reverse—that we are moving from 18th-century centralism to the medieval localism of the late middle ages to the rule of bishops in the early middle ages.
and finally to the end of the Roman Empire. In doing so, we are not positing an argument about backwardness, one that is the mirror image to the doctrine of progress. Rather, we seek to highlight the ebb and flow of urbanisation, the simultaneity of different logics of urbanism and the value of a non-linear approach to historical time. Our approach, as Benjamin (1950, p. 263) would argue, is historical materialism rather than historicism, one in which we seek to “blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history”. It is our hope that such an approach makes possible a complex engagement with history, one that allows us to think about history not as linear periodisation but instead as a reservoir of concepts, the mining of which makes possible the articulation of theory. It also historicises seemingly ‘new’ urban practices, thereby showing that these are not simply deviant or anomalous forms but rather fundamental components of urban landscapes. If some of our previous work has been ‘transnational’ in scope, using ‘there’ to pose critical questions about ‘here’ (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004), then this argument is ‘transhistorical’, generating questions about ‘now’ from the perspective of ‘then’.

Above all, this paper is an attempt to complicate concepts such as ‘modernity’ or ‘democracy’ that are taken for granted in discussions of contemporary urbanism. The long history of cities reveals the entanglement of democracy and freedom with the political structures of empire and medievalism. The articulation of present-day cities as ‘medieval’ calls into question the inevitability of progress. In order to draw attention to the enduring paradoxes of urban life and form, we thus use the paradoxical phrase ‘medieval modernity’, suggesting that medieval forms of organisation and community can lurk at the heart of the modern.

1. Gated Enclaves

In cities, from Los Angeles to Manila, the most common paradigm of spatial organisation is today the gated enclave, one that is maintained through elaborate techniques of surveillance, policing and architectural design. Not only are these residential spaces walled and gated, but they are also linked to other spaces of exclusion such as urban mega-projects and leisure developments. It is this bundling of urban spaces of seduction and safety that Graham and Marvin (2001) designate as splintering urbanism: secessionary network spaces held together through premium networked infrastructure and that quite literally ‘secede’ from surrounding urban environments. Such forms of segregation are now manifested both horizontally and vertically. From elevated quasi-private toll roads and skyways to fortressed high-rise structures, there is a three-dimensional landscape of exclusion and polarisation (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 284).

These trends appear with great starkness in Brazil where the élite have retreated to gated communities, seeking to sever connections with the urban poor, although of course as Caldeira (2000) points out, the poor are still needed to clean the swimming pools and tend the lawns. Today, São Paulo has the world’s largest fleet of private helicopters because its urban élite has abandoned city streets for the inaccessible skies. The best-selling helicopter in Brazil is the Robinson R44, which comfortably seats four people. It costs about $380 000 or roughly 90 times the average annual income of a São Paulo resident (New York Times, 15 February, 2000). Why settle for an armoured BMW when one can afford a helicopter? In this Blade-Runneresque segregation, as the few hundred members of the urban élite roam the skies in their helicopters, so 3.7 million residents struggle with the
city’s precarious bus system each day. Weizman and Segal (2003) conceptualise this carving up of the city into separate spheres of circulation as a politics of verticality. They note how Jewish settlements strategically located in the West Bank occupy the places on the hill, suburban enclaves separated from the much poorer Palestinian neighbours but also enjoying a vertical sovereignty of surveillance and infrastructure networks provided to them by the military apparatus of the Israeli state.

Such landscapes of walling and gating indicate a distinctive territorialisation of citizenship, or what Low (2003, p. 390) calls a new spatial governmentality. The key characteristic of these spatial regimes is the formation of gated compounds that are governed by private bodies. Common interest developments (CID s) epitomise this trend. A CID describes a community in which the residents own or control common areas or shared amenities and that carries with it reciprocal rights and obligations enforced by a private governing body. Codified as specialised covenants, contracts and deed restrictions (CCandRs), this governance structure creates new types of private government in the form of ‘home-owner associations’ (Low, 2003, p. 390; Davis, 1990). As McKenzie (1994) notes, these “privatopias” mark the “secession of the successful”. Here, contract law is the supreme authority; property values are the foundation of community life; and exclusion is the foundation of social organisation (see also Flusty and Dear, 1999).

Today’s gated enclaves can be understood in relation to medieval urbanism and the formation of chartered towns. Pirenne’s (1925, pp. 193–194) famous argument about medieval cities is that “the air of the city makes free”: “Freedom, in the Middle Ages, was an attribute as inseparable from the rank of citizen of a city as it is in our day of that of the citizen of a State”. The key elements of this freedom included personal liberty—i.e. freedom from feudal serfdom—and freedom of land—i.e. the freedom to transfer and convey property in a manner similar to what we today think of as real estate (Pirenne, 1925, p. 194). It was the city charter that bestowed these freedoms, creating a legal district whereby to live in a corporate town for a year and a day removed the obligations of serfdom, the most notable of which was the feudal lord’s control over the minds and bodies of feudal subjects (Mumford, 1961, p. 262). And indeed these legal enclaves were governed by a system of rules and regulations, including those that produced a highly controlled built environment with aesthetic unity. For example, in Siena, there was great effort to complete, polish and codify the more informal physical arrangement of its early history. There, in the 14th century, the city council passed a law requiring that “any edifices being made anew proceed only in line with the consistent buildings . . . and shall be disposed and arranged equally so as to be of greatest beauty to the city” (Kostof, 1991, p. 70). In Bruges, the merchants represented by the associational guilds played a major role in the process that governed the formation of public spaces and, in Florence of the late middle ages, the young republic codified its control over the city streets (Kostof, 1985, pp. 359, 371). This was an aesthetic unity, which subsumed or subjected individual action to a larger collective ideal. The covenants, codes and regulations (CCandRs) of today’s home-owners associations and the New Urbanist codes and pattern books achieve a similar effect, creating aesthetically codified and unified enclaves.

The most significant implications of medieval urbanism for the understanding of contemporary cities rest in the concept of freedom. The city charter that guaranteed freedom had particular paradoxes. First, it was an enclave of freedom
premised on the idea of a 'freedom from'—in this case, the freedom from confiscatory tolls and other exactions levied by feudal lords (Hollister, 1964, p. 148) or by the bishops (Pirenne, 1925). Pirenne writes

> Nothing was further from the mind of the original middle classes than any conception of the rights of man and citizen. Personal liberty itself was not claimed as a natural right. It was sought only for the advantages it conferred (Pirenne, 1925, p. 171).

These advantages related primarily to occupation, such as the practice of crafts and the pursuit of trade. Secondly, the charter was inherently exclusionary. Its benefits, such as the proceeds of communal taxes or the protections of the penal code, could only extend to those living within the chartered enclave. The urban middle class then became like the clergy and nobility—a privileged order with a special legal and territorial modality that allowed it to preserve its exceptional status and associated benefits to the exclusion of the mass of rural inhabitants. In Pirenne’s words (1925, p. 212), freedom was a monopoly. Thirdly, such freedom could only be exercised through association. “There was no security except through group protection and no freedom that did not recognise the constant obligations of a corporate life” (Mumford, 1961, p. 269). Despite the differences in scale, it is possible to compare today’s home-owners’ association with the medieval chartered enclave. Today, property matters in the way occupation mattered in the middle ages. In both cases, urban citizenship is premised on the management of a secessionary space of internal regulations and codes.

Finally, medieval associational enclaves competed with one another, setting the stage for the fragmented sovereignty that we will discuss in the following section. The chartered town of the late middle ages was a revolt against the early medieval rule of the bishops (Pirenne, 1925, p. 177). The chartered towns were often created by prosperous merchants who ruled as “town oligarchies” (Hollister, 1964, p. 149). In some of these towns, the merchant guild came to dominate the craft guild, superseding the rule of master craftsmen with the rule of merchants as in Flemish towns until a revolt of the crafts guilds in the 14th century (Girouard, 1987). The competition among guilds was matched by the competition among merchants and feudal lords. In some cases, feudal lords issued town charters that guaranteed “personal freedom from serf-like status, freedom of movement, freedom from inordinate tolls, the right to own property” (Hollister, 1964, p. 149). In other cases, alliances were struck between royal authorities and municipal chartered enclaves as a means to weaken the feudal nobility (Mumford, 1961). The medieval landscape then was one where freedom was constantly negotiated through both secession and hierarchy.

The case of Italian cities in the late Middle Ages is indicative of these struggles. Here, as analysed by Kostof (1991, p. 50), noble families had reproduced within the cities fortified strongholds of their rural residences, forming semi-autonomous, nucleated wards bristling with defensive towers. One of the main tests of nascent communes, or self-governing city-states, in the later middle ages, would be to crack open these private pockets and reclaim the streets and public places in the name of the entire citizenry.

But citizenship itself was a limited concept: “full citizens” were a “jealous minority, a small town inside the town itself” (Braudel, 1979, p. 518). And while these enclaves of the powerful were challenged, the city itself sought to remain as an enclave, seeking at another scale to become a city-state or municipal republic.
As Pirenne (1925, p. 228) notes, “If they had the power they would have every-where become States within the State”. Between the 15th and 18th centuries, in Europe, these enclaves were “reunited under a new sign: the sign of the Prince”, a sign exemplified by Machiavelli’s treatise (Mumford, 1961, p. 347). Citizenship was to be now coded and regulated not in the exceptional status of the city charter, but rather generalised throughout the space-economy of the modern nation-state.

It is of course possible to talk about gated enclaves and contemporary urban citizenship without any reference to medieval cities. It is possible to document the growing number of enclaves, to explain the operation of the circuits of property capital and to analyse the ‘ecology of fear’ that produces the aesthetics of safe communities. These are all important forms of scholarship, but they are not our project. We have argued, in this brief historical detour, that the medieval analogy illuminates two key dimensions of contemporary gated enclaves: the monopolistic nature of freedom as territorialised in urban space and codified in urban charters; and the multiplicity and fragmentation of sovereignty. Such issues move us from thinking about gated enclaves as ‘effects’ of neo-liberalism or social conservatism to analysing them as technologies of subjectivation, sovereignty and spatiality. Gated enclaves give materiality to what Rose (1999), deploying Foucault, has termed the ‘powers of freedom’, the forms of governing that presuppose the freedom of the governed. In other words, the enclave is an important technology of rule, a form of rule that operates through the double helix of liberty and sovereignty, of freedom and protection.

2. The Regulated Squatter Settlement

Throughout history, squatting has been an important mechanism of settling the land. Today, squatter settlements, often referred to as informal housing, constitute a considerable portion of the built environments in the cities of the global South. The processes by which squatter settlements come into existence, develop, consolidate and acquire an urban form are numerous and diverse. These often reverse the traditional trajectory of urban planning, first initiating land settlement, followed by building and then the acquisition of infrastructure and services. Rather than being designated as ‘illegal’, these practices have been more usefully understood as unregulated activities in a context where similar activities are regulated (Portes et al., 1989). This ‘unregulation’ is in and of itself a distinct form of regulation, a set of tactics that recreate informality as governmentality. As we have elsewhere argued, urban informality is an organising urban logic.

It is a process of structuration that constitutes the rules of the game, determining the nature of transactions between individuals and institutions and within institutions. If formality operates through the fixing of value, including the mapping of spatial value, then informality operates through the constant negotiability of value (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004, p. 5).

Roy has specifically argued that informality is an expression of the sovereign power to establish the state of exception.

The planning and legal apparatus of the state has the power to determine when to enact this suspension, to determine what is informal and what is not, and to determine which forms of informality will thrive and which
will disappear. State power is reproduced through the capacity to construct and reconstruct categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy (Roy, 2004, p. 8).

Regulation then is key to informality and it is this concept that is made evident by the study of medieval urbanism.

The topic of squatting is an important element of the discourse on medieval cities. Kostof has argued that most medieval cities, whether in Europe or the Middle East, were a product of ‘synoecism’: the organic process that occurs when several smaller—often rural—agglomerations are adjoined in the process of urban growth (Kostof, 1991, p. 34). In later work, Kostof equates ‘medievalising’ with the incremental informality of squatting. Analysing Rome during the collapse of the Roman Empire, he shows how the municipal offices of the Praefectura Urbana cease to function, how citizens begin to leave the dense landscape of the residential tenements—insulae—and to squat inside and outside many of the unattended structures of the old city. This gradual process, one that Kostof calls ‘medievalising Rome’, took 1000 years and gradually changed the geometric urban fabric of the city to the point of totally camouflaging the original on which it was built (Kostof, 1992, pp. 279–290).

However, there is quite a bit more to these processes than simply a change in physical form and urban morphology. What is at stake is the distinctive politics of space. As in contemporary times, squatting in the middle ages was a highly regulated practice. What at first glance seems to be a landscape of disorder was in fact produced through intricate webs of norms and regulations. In the medieval cities of the Middle East, the muhtasib, a figure equivalent to the European podesta, acted as policeman of buildings and markets. The muhtasib did not eradicate informality but rather formalised informal practices by first allowing them to happen, then accepting them as precedent and finally finding legal Islamic rulings to validate their acceptance (AlSayyad, 1981). An example can be given of a shop owner who occupies a particular part of the street to spread his wares. There is no code that prevents him from doing so; yet his doing so interferes with the function of circulation and movement within the city. Either as a result of a complaint or an inspection by the office of the muhtasib, the shopkeeper is told either to withdraw his goods from the public space or is allowed to occupy only a certain part of it. Other shopkeepers observe the incident and eventually adopt the convention. There thus emerges a mode of appropriation of urban public space for private commercial use. That mode of urban life is then accepted and normalised by the city administration and the residents equally (AlSayyad, 1981). Another example involves the resident of a house expanding by adding a second floor. Structural elements have to be built into the public space of the street, possibly building over it, and the addition also overlooks the private space of other houses. Such violations of social norms would not be tolerated by the office of the muhtasib so the person engaging in the expansion negotiates both with his neighbours for the exact location of the windows, hence resolving the issue of violating their privacy, as well as with the city administration about the extent of intrusion into public space; hence minimising the infraction while still occupying part of the airspace of a street without interfering with its function of circulation and transport (Akbar, 1988). Such examples in fact exist in both the east and the west, such as the Sabbats of Tunis and the Sotto-Portici of Venice. Through such delicate negotiations the urban fabric of the city, a constellation
of irregular forms, becomes legitimised (AlSayyad and Bristol, 1992). This process of negotiability, which existed in many Arab cities during the middle ages, should not be interpreted as a revolt against the state. Instead, it can be understood as the articulation of a particular form of citizenship involving an alliance between the different groups that constituted the bulk of urban societies.

The discussion of modern informality has paid considerable attention to urban politics. It is now well established that modern states, be they democratic or authoritarian, produce and manage informality as a way of underwriting capitalist accumulation and securing political legitimacy (Castells, 1983). However, in recent years, there has been a growing interest in what seem to be new forms of governance and politics in the domain of urban informality. With the deepening of neo-liberal austerity policies, non-state actors have emerged as the de facto state in informal settlements in various world-regions (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004). Most striking is the convergence between informal geographies and the territorialisation of religious fundamentalisms. With the withdrawal of the state from social spending programmes, religious fundamentalist groups have become the main provider of urban services in informal settlements (Bayat, 2002).

One of the key sites at which such processes first became sharply evident is the neighbourhood of Imbaba in Cairo. In 1992, the Egyptian army stormed Imbaba ending the rule of an Islamist group, al Gamaa al Islamiya, which had declared Imbaba to be a ‘state within a state’. How did an Islamist group establish this zone of sovereignty? The answer partly lies in neo-liberal restructuring. Egypt’s quite strict adherence to the rules of structural adjustment has boded ill for the urban poor of cities like Cairo. In neighbourhoods like Imbaba, there has been a sharp increase in poverty and informal employment. Comprised of dilapidated public housing projects and squatter settlements, in the late 1970s, Imbaba was the site of bread riots triggered by IMF policies (Ibrahim, 1982). By the 1980s, Imbaba had been taken over by the al Gamaa al Islamiya, a group linked to the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, which came to be the de facto state. On the one hand, it provided almost all social services—from health care to education. On the other hand, it divided Imbaba into 10 sections, each ruled by an ‘emir’ governing according to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam (Ismail, 2000).

Imbaba is not an exception. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah, a group high on the US’s post 9-11 list of terrorist organisations, is also the de facto state. Its development programmes in the southern suburbs of Beirut include the provision of housing through its Jihad for Construction, education, medical services, water, sewage systems and electricity (El-Kak, 2001; Bayat, 2002). And as Beirut is remade through elaborate urban projects such as Solidere or Elyssar, so Hezbollah has emerged as the main mediator of housing rights for the Shiite poor (Majdalani, 2001). Its rise to power can only be understood in the context of civil-war Beirut where the city was divided into various zones each governed by a religious militia, which was not only a war machine but also an apparatus of service provision and development. In Mumbai, Hindu fundamentalist groups like the Shiva Sena have won popularity at the urban scale by promising to reclaim space in the city’s absurdly tight housing and land markets. This reclamation of course comes, as Appadurai (2000) notes, through the violent erasure of the Muslim body. Or, in the case of Latin American slums and squatter settlements, Pentecostalism has emerged as the logic of governance and politics (Davis, 2004). Obviously, not all of these religious regimes are fundamentalist. In some
cases, the logic of religion is secondary to kin and village-based networks as in the self-help associations of urban Egypt, described by Bayat (2002) as “social Islam”. Nevertheless, these associations carve up the city into different orders of citizenship, inaugurating religious regimes of urban rule and urban regimes of religious rule. Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, pp. 310, 327) thus designate these religious regimes to be a hallmark of neo-liberal capitalism, a “privatisation of the millennium” through the creation of para-states and a re-formation of citizenship as “conditional, partial, and situational”.

Once again, medieval urbanism provides a useful analytical framework for such contemporary processes. As depicted by Pirenne (1925, p. 63), in the early middle ages, the city was synonymous with religious administration. The terms civis and civitas had no legal significance; they only meant residence in the episcopal city. The rule of the bishops emerged in the context of the disappearance of trade in the 9th century. The bishops acted not simply as religious leaders, but also enjoyed loosely defined police powers such as the supervision of markets and the regulation of tolls (Pirenne, 1925, p. 68). This was the articulation of citizenship in the highly diminished sense of patronage without any of the complex urban associational forms that were to recalibrate patronage and protection in the later middle ages. Indeed, Pirenne interprets the chartered town of late medievalism as a revolt against the bishops. How then should we view contemporary urban regimes of religious rule? Can they be seen as the revolt against the gated enclave and the secession of the successful? If the middle ages witnessed the rule of the charter as a revolt against the bishops, then perhaps today’s rule of the bishops is a revolt by those excluded from the largesse of the neo-liberal charter.

However, as we have already discussed, medieval urbanism rarely had a single logic of rule. For the most part, the medieval city was governed by an uneasy but lasting alliance between merchants, represented in the guilds; religious authorities, represented by the church; and burgs, represented by the townhall. The alliances with feudal lords were less stable. Lapidus (1984, p. XV) makes the argument that the medieval cities of the Middle East, unlike their European counterparts, lacked these territorialised forms of association. He suggests that in the Middle East, there were ‘ungoverned’ political communities, but ones that were nevertheless held together by social relations such as Muslim religious associations. Regardless of the precise calculus of governance, the medieval city can be seen then as a space of competing sovereignties, one that operated through a territorialised logic of association and patronage, be it the religious rule of early medievalism or the urban guilds of the high middle ages.

As in the case of the gated enclave, the informalisation of contemporary urban space can be discussed without reference to medieval cities. It is possible to sort through the connections between neo-liberalism and informalisation; to identify the various forms of informality in the neo-liberal city; to trace the historical emergence of spaces like Imbaba in the context of the political economy of dependency and structural adjustment. But these arguments, some of which we have made elsewhere, are not the focus of our concern in this paper. Instead, we seek to highlight the ways in which the medieval analogy draws attention to a key dimension of the regulated squatter settlement: the multiplicity and complicity of sovereignty. The regulated squatter settlement of medieval times functions through the logic of patronage. It expresses the negotiability of the rules and regulations that govern city-space. But when patronage is formalised in the rule
of bishops, the scope of negotiability is drastically reduced. The logic of patronage becomes the logic of rule. And yet, in the medieval city, the logic of rule is never singular; the terrain is always that of uneasy alliances and shifting sovereignties. Such a discussion of the logic of rule recasts the debate around contemporary cities. Today's urbanism has been often diagnosed as a moment of sharpened exclusion and inclusion, mapped through patterns of segregation and dramatically represented in the icon of the wall or gate. Such is the vocabulary of the 'dual city', evoking an imagery of those who are plugged in and those who are switched off and rendered redundant (Castells, 1996). The medieval analogy allows a different understanding of what Mbembe and Roitman (2002) call the "figure of the subject in the time of crisis". This is not simply a figure that is either included or excluded, within the gated enclave or outside it; rather, this figure is one that crafts intricate forms of negotiability and rationality, as in what Bayat (2000) calls the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary". Such an approach makes it possible to view structural power not as a monolithic and singular regime of rule, but rather as a fragmented domain of multiple and competing sovereignties. This is sharply evident in contemporary informal settlements where there is a fierce competition between different territorialised forms of association and patronage—be they the state, religious organisations, NGOs, or international development institutions. It is this excess of power, articulated through fragmentation and multiplicity, that makes today's city a site of overwhelming dominance. As in the medieval city, these competing sovereignties cannot be understood in the sense of interest-group liberalism, a democratic system of checks and balances. Rather, they must be understood as a hardening of ever-fragmenting fundamentalisms and parochialisms—the politics of fiefdoms negotiated through modes of visible and invisible regulations.

3. The Camp

The contemporary moment can be interpreted as a moment of transition with empire looming large on the horizon. In recent years, there has been the growing sense that neo-liberal globalisation is transmuting into imperial globalisation, or at least revealing its inevitably imperial character. One of the most debated accounts of empire is that provided by Hardt and Negri (2000). In their influential analysis, they argue that today's empire is a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. xii). However, they also emphasise that this "smooth space" (p. 337) of global sovereignty requires a new management of social space, specifically fractal modalities of administration.

The segmentation of the multitude has in fact been the condition of political administration throughout history. The difference today lies in the fact that, whereas in modern regimes of national sovereignty, administration worked towards a linear integration of conflicts and towards a coherent apparatus that could repress them … in the imperial framework administration becomes fractal and aims to integrate conflicts not by imposing a coherent social apparatus but by controlling differences (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 339).

They compare the local regimes of empire with medieval political systems, particularly the administrative relationship between feudal territorial organisations and monarchical power structures. Such forms of fractal administration
are amply evident today. Post-war Afghanistan is a stark example where the so-called central government, answering to American imperial administrators, has control mainly over Kabul and where the rest of the country is constituted of zones of sovereignty ruled by warlords. Mbembe writes of the new moment of war

The claim to ultimate or final authority in a political space is not easily made. Instead, a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights to rule emerges, inextricably superimposed and tangled, in which different de facto juridical instances are geographically interwoven and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties, and enclaves abound (Mbembe, 2003, p. 31).

Under such conditions, the paradigmatic spatial type is the camp. Following Agamben (1995, p. 174), the camp can be seen as “a space in which the normal order is de facto suspended”. In other words, the camp is the space where the state of emergency, and thus the state of exception, becomes the rule, a permanent spatial arrangement. Note the following exchange during recent Supreme Court arguments regarding Guantanamo detainees where the administration represented by Mr Theodore Olson argued that the US courts did not have any jurisdiction over these detainees because of the permanent exceptionalism of the war on terror.

*Justice John Paul Stevens*: Mr Olson, supposing the war had ended, could you continue to detain these people in Guantanamo, and would there then be jurisdiction?

*Mr Theodore Olson*: We believe there would not be jurisdiction.


If empire is understood as an endless frontier of just bellum, war in the name of justice (Hardt and Negri, 2000), then the camp is precisely the space in which violence is constantly deployed in the name of peace and order. In this sense, the camp can be many different spaces: the prison, the war prison, the homeless shelter, the labour camp, the internment camp, the refugee camp.

The camp is a post-city space. It calls into question the normative relationship between cities and citizenship. As Agamben argues (1995, p. 181), the camp throws a sinister light on the models by which social sciences, sociology, urban studies and architecture today are trying to conceive and organise the public space of the world’s cities without any clear awareness that at their very centre lies the same bare life (even if it has been transformed and rendered apparently more human) that defined the biopolitics of the great totalitarian states of the 20th century.

The trinity of state/subject/space that underpins the liberal discourse of cities and citizenship is recalibrated in the camp. This is a space of ‘no-law’, a subject that is ‘bare life’, and a state that combines control with care, death with life.

The camp is the space of exception because at the moment of emergency it is designated as an extra-territorial space. Here, sovereignty exceeds national borders, extending the suspension of law to bodies outside the body politic. But extra-territoriality is more than this. As evident in Guantanamo, it is a ‘no-law’ zone, one that is created through the duplicity of sovereignty: the US claims that Cuba has ‘ultimate sovereignty’ but that the US has ‘complete jurisdiction
and control’. Guantanamo then is an overdetermined space, one that can be understood through the Orwellian concept of doublethink: holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously and accepting both of them. The US is the sovereign power in Guantanamo and yet can hold foreign nationals there, since 1991, who because they are being held outside US territory have no rights under the US constitution.

In the no-law zone of the camp, subjects are rendered as ‘bare life’. In her recent engagement with Agamben’s work, Butler (2004, p. 98) notes that the camp is not simply a state of exception, but also a state of desubjectivation. It is here that “certain subjects undergo a suspension of their ontological status as subjects when states of emergency are invoked” (Butler, 2004, p. 67). This is “bare life”—“neither living in the sense that a political animal lives, in community and bound by law, nor dead, and, therefore outside the constituting condition of the rule of law”. It is in this sense that the camp exceeds biopower, for the biopolitical subject becomes bare life and sovereignty, becomes what Mbembe (2003) calls ‘necropolitics’, the demarcation of those subjects whose life and death do not matter.

But the exercise of sovereignty in the camp is not simply the suspension of the rule of law. The camp is the paradoxical space where the law is suspended by the keeper of the law and in the name of peace, order and the greater good. The camp is also, in Malkki’s (2002, p. 353) words, a “device of care and control”, where care depends on the exceptional humanitarianism of the sovereign: “whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign” (Agamben, 1995, p. 174). Remember Abu Ghraib?

There are many possible analogies between the biopolitical space of the camp and the medieval city. The construction of ‘no-law’ spaces is one such point of congruence. As evident in the on-going war in Iraq, the security and military apparatus is becoming increasingly privatised, with mercenaries engaged in the protection of US envoys, in the interrogation of prisoners and in the management of oil infrastructure. No legal jurisdiction attaches to these mercenaries for they operate through an exceptional status. This is very much reminiscent of the role played by mercenary groups often employed along ethnic or racial lines to help settle and control the Islamic cities of the early middle ages, be they garrison towns or caliphal seats of power or occupied cities (AlSayyad, 1991). Such trends once again require that territorialised power be understood beyond the concepts of segregation, walling and quarantine, that it be understood also through concepts of exceptionalism.

But such discussions of the camp do not require a turn to the medieval city. Foucault and Agamben suffice as sources of analytical concepts. What then is the added value of a medieval analogy with regard to the camp? Here, it is worth turning to a very specific debate about one type of camp: the refugee camp. Recently Agier has posited the possibility of the city-camp. He argues that, while the refugee camp is a crippled form of the urban, as were apartheid townships, it is possible to witness some key dimensions of the city in the camp: in the relational sense of the urbs and in the political sense of the polis. In particular, he is interested in the ways in which a specific ethnic chessboard is set up in the camps (Agier, 2002, p. 332). His language, that in the camp the nationalities become ethnicities, echoes not only medieval historians like Pirenne but also the Chicago School of urban sociology: the sense of the city as
a mosaic of ethno-nationalities. Arguing against Agier, Malkki (2002) asserts that the issue of urban citizenship cannot be so easily broached in relation to the refugee camp. Following Agamben, she sees the camp as the space of bare life, an absolute biopolitical space, one that sharply contrasts with the cosmopolitanism of the city. In her framework, the camp is the not-city.

This debate about the city/camp conjures up the ‘ethnic quarter’ of medieval urbanism both in the East and the West. In the Arab-Islamic city of the middle ages, ethnic or religious groups were sequestered in specific quarters and neighbourhoods. Often these ethnic or religious populations were assigned to or managed to take hold of a particular urban function or trade (Hourani, 1970). Their movement in and out of the ethnic quarters was sometimes curbed under oppressive regimes or in times of hardship. The Jewish quarters in many of the medieval cities of both Europe and the Middle East seem to have emerged as a response to the desire to exclude Jews from some aspects of urban life and economic exchange, while at the same time allowing them a degree of economic flexibility (Gottriech, 2003). The ethnic quarters, in other words, produced second-class ethnic citizens.

Here, the issue of segregation in the medieval Arab-Islamic city requires some reflection. Most cities in the Arab world during the middle ages demonstrated a high level of segregation based on ethnicity, race, religion or tribal affiliation. Whether it was Tunis of the 16th century, or Aleppo of the 17th century, there can be no denial of the importance of the ethnic quarter (Raymond, 1985, p. 131). But it would be a mistake to label all these ethnic quarters ghettos, as with the original ghetto of Venice or as in the modern sense of the word. In fact, at least in the Middle East, some ethnic and religious groups were not forced into living in such quarters. It was not until the Ottoman empire took control of most of the cities of the Arab world that this segregation became state induced. The enforcement of this new trend did not emerge as a response to fears of ethnic violence, for such minority communities enjoyed good social relations with other groups. Instead, it seems that these segregated communities, like the modern refugee camp, were a device of the state apparatus to manage and control ethnic populations (Raymond, 1985, p. 22). And here, ethnic minorities found a degree of religious and social autonomy that they otherwise would not have enjoyed (Raymond, 1985, p. 221).

While the ethnic quarter may be seen as a mode of life, with the ‘inventions of the everyday’ and ‘bricolage of novel identities’ evident in Agier’s city-camp, it must be also recognised as a mechanism of control. Like today’s camp, the ethnic quarter of the medieval city was a space of exception, one in which urban citizenship was suspended through the flexibility of sovereign power. The ethnic quarter as a space of exception did not lie outside the juridical order of the city; it was not the lack of law that preceded the law. Rather, through its exceptional status it was constitutive of the very concept of urban citizenship—as in the city-states of Greece and Rome, women and slaves through their exclusion constituted the notion of ‘free men’ as full citizens. In a similar vein, the camp is constitutive of today’s city.

It is worth taking this a step further. The camp can be seen to constitute the city as a ‘constitutive outside’. While Agier and Malkki sharply differ on whether the refugee camp can morph into a city, they both theorise the city as a norm that is opposed to the camp. For Agier, the city can be understood in the Chicago School sense of an ecology of ethnicities, or in de Certeau’s mapping of everyday
practices that unsettle the grid of power. For Malkki, the city is a space of cosmopolitanism, a node in Appadurai’s (2003) post-national order, and one that contrasts with the purified and hardened ethno-nationalism of the camp. Both Agier and Malkki therefore posit a view of the city that is reminiscent of Pirenne’s argument that “the air of the city makes free”. The medieval ethnic quarter indicates that the city was never ‘free’—or, rather, that its freedoms came through the bounding and containing of the Other. In this sense, such spaces of exception are the ‘constitutive inside’ of cities. They are the forms of exceptionalism that constitute the grid of the normal. They lie not at the extra-territorial periphery of cityspace, but are instead the very modalities of statehood, subjectivity, and space that produce the city. To state this in the language of our times would be to say that city and camp are inevitably linked because ‘our’ freedoms are premised on ‘their’ unfreedoms; because after a while it is impossible to police the boundaries between exception and generalisation, between ethnonationalism and cosmopolitanism, between the soldier at Abu Ghraib and the correctional officer in West Virginia, between atrocity and necessity.

**Medieval Modernity: A Concluding Note**

There are many different conceptual tools for discussing contemporary cities and forms of urban citizenship. Our critics could ask, why not simply talk about the exclusions and segmentations of contemporary cities? Is this not a mapping of the contours of the neo-liberal city and does this not therefore demand an explanation of the neo-liberal production of space? Yes, but that project that has been undertaken by many worthy colleagues. What persists in the analysis of neo-liberalism, in the language that we ourselves have used in previous publications, is a sense of newness: of a new mode of production, of a new production of space, of new forms of discipline and control. Our use of the ‘medieval’ is meant to call into question this teleology, the inevitable march through historical phases and modes of production and social regulation. Our conceptual framework will perhaps be a matter of great discomfort for historical materialists, for are we not severing the ‘medieval’ from the ‘feudal’ mode of production? Is this not a trivialisation of the historical production of space? In response to such anxieties, we advance the following claims.

First, the use of ‘medieval’ as an analytical category makes possible a break with teleological understandings of the modern. If the ‘feudal’ is a system of political, economic and social relationships and if the ‘medieval’ is a system of ordering space, then the seemingly oxymoronic phrasing of ‘medieval modernity’ indicates how the medieval lurks at the heart of the modern, how the feudal exists within capitalism. This is the ‘hellish repetition’ that allows Benjamin to annihilate the myth of historical progress (Buck-Morss, 1991). Such critiques of teleology also force a rethinking of the very category of the modern. The examples of citizenship that we have discussed indicate how the modern city functions through a medieval ordering of space. They also indicate that these medieval-type spatial formations express modern identities and aspirations such as the right to the production of space, or the promise of democracy and economic prosperity. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, p. 313) note of regimes of religious rule: they embody “a potent form of time–space compression”, “the ability to deliver in the here and now . . . as the measure of a genuinely global God”. The oxymoronic phrasing of ‘medieval modernity’ thus reveals the inherent paradoxes of the
modern: fiefdoms of democracy, the materialist immediacy of religious fundamentalism, the simultaneity of war and humanitarianism. Like the term ‘Islamic modernities’ (Watts, 1996), it exceeds the geopolitical diversity implied by concepts such as ‘alternative’ or ‘multiple modernities’. Here, modernity does not simply take on different forms in different places, but rather is recognised as an inevitably fractured, divided and contradicted project.

Secondly, this complication of the modern is a reckoning with the story of origins, with the narrative of an original modernity produced in the originary site of the city. Here it is worth quoting at length from a piece by Robert Stein on the critical function of medieval studies.

Fifteenth Century humanists began writing of their own time as the Renaissance and in the process created the Middle Ages to mark the period between themselves and the classical antiquity they were intent on emulating and appropriating. The designation Renaissance is thus an origin point: it emerges from that definitively modern moment of historical self-consciousness when Western Europe begins to narrate itself. This moment brings into being a notion of modernity and simultaneously with it a narrative of its history. No modernity, no historicity. Or to put it another way, History itself is from the beginning always and only the narrative of modernity’s own coming into being. The Middle Ages, located between two moments in the narrative of the modern, has merely a delaying function … the middle ages is the part of the story that “need not” be told… I do not mean by this that historical periodization is arbitrary in the sense of meaninglessness; rather, I want to emphasize that meaning is produced, not given, and periodization is structurally determinate precisely because it is too produced—and in a narrative … A period boundary by virtue of its demarcation is a place where meaning is produced (Stein, 1995).

Once urban theory is located at this ‘period boundary’, it becomes possible to ask questions about the past and future but without assumptions of progress and backwardness. While medieval modernity replaces the myth of historical progress with Benjamin’s notion of hellish repetition, it also suggests the anticipatory dynamics of the city. How do we complicate the notion of linear time that is related to anticipation? How do we begin to talk about those forms of modernity where the future is worse than the past (Ferguson, 1999; Mbembe and Roitman, 2002), when in so many world-regions the idea of progress has been hollowed-out? So a promise remains, an anticipation persists, but it is not necessarily that of progress, of a future that is better than the past. Through our attention to medieval urbanism, we have suggested that modern forms of national citizenship might be giving way to a fractal and splintered territorialisation of citizenship in medieval enclaves. Is this medievalism in turn giving way to empire? It is not our intention to suggest a reverse teleology, where one historical phase gives way to another. Rather these time–space modalities—of modern nationalism, medieval enclaves and imperial brutality—co-exist in non-linear fashion, complicating the whole issue of progress and backwardness, the modern and pre-modern. Nevertheless, the provocative question remains, if we were to anticipate, what would we anticipate? Some historians have argued that this is not just a moment of empire; rather, it is the long drawn-out end of empire, bearing uncanny resemblance to the spectacles of extermination, the ritualistic excesses
and the violent frontiers of a dying Roman empire. If we find this congruence convincing, what can one anticipate at the end of empire? Is it the revival of cities and citizenship in the middle ages that were after a while to follow the death of Rome? Or is it a return to the height of empire, to the Platonic and Aristotelian cities of ‘free men’? In both futures, the freedoms of urban citizenship are entangled with the unfreedoms of slavery, serfdom, hierarchy and exclusion. Perhaps democracy has always been either imperial or medieval, forged in the glory of imperial Rome or the pragmatism of feudal societies.

Thirdly, the explicit reference to the medieval city makes possible a confrontation with alterity. In various disciplines, the ‘medieval’ continues to be framed as the ‘other’ (Lilley, 2004). It is the realm of medievalists and not critical theorists. It is the realm of historians and not of geographers or urbanists. This is not simply a question of disciplinary divides and specialisations. It is also the persistence of two troubling time-space dualisms: the separation of history and geography; and an alterity of time which is also the alterity of space. The medieval is often seen as pre-modern, as anachronistic, as the dark ages. Our term ‘medieval modernity’ is a modest contribution to the many efforts that indicate the modern character of the medieval city and that inevitably call into question the superiority of ‘our’ modernity.

But the term ‘medieval’ is also being resuscitated to signal the end of the modern and the return of the Other, the barbarian. At a time of empire, the temporal otherness of the medieval is being rewritten as geopolitical otherness. This is the use of ‘medieval’ in the international relations literature, by those lamenting the end of the modern world order, those like Kobrin (1999, p. 166), worried that “the modern era may be a window that is about to slam shut”, that the future is “neomedieval”. Thus Robin Wright, Foreign Policy correspondent for the Washington Post, asks “Will the modern era come undone in Iraq?” (Washington Post, 16 May, 2004, p. B01). She frames this moment as the final phase of modernisation, taking longer to complete than expected, with the holdouts to the modern being this last bloc of nations, the Middle East, the space that has resisted the wave of empowerment and modernity that has swept the rest of the world. Her discourse reveals how the civilising process is one that contends not with the historical past but rather with the spaces of exception that are imagined to be the savage past, as evident in the current American vocabulary of ‘Arab barbarians’ and ‘old Europe’. In this sense, the modern is always medieval, always pre-modern. In this sense, time is always articulated in space.

One final note. If this paper is an attempt to trouble the teleology of the modern, it is also an attempt to trouble the normative concept of the ‘city’. The medieval lurks at the heart of the modern. So does the camp lurk at the heart of the city. While we have depicted three categories of spatial formation, these categories are not mutually exclusive. They overlap; for example, the gated enclave is often produced through informal regulations. All three spatial formations are expressions of what might be billed as ‘enclave modernity’. But more importantly, they are all states of exception. If Agamben’s notion of the camp is seen not as a spatial category, but instead as a diagram of power (as is Foucault’s use of the panopticon), then the various spaces discussed in this paper are marked by this logic of sovereignty. This logic is a medieval logic. This logic is one that forces us to think about a post-city urbanism where the paradigm is not the city—not even the exclusionary neo-liberal city—but rather the state of exception.
Notes

1. The Chicago School is usually identified with the urban ecology approach. We are arguing that the ‘global city’ concept maintains this ecological approach, but applies it at a different scale—i.e. at the scale of the global rather than of the city.

2. For good coverage of these different interpretations of cities and citizenship, see Holston and Appadurai (1999).

3. It is important to note that the Guantanamo cases winding their way through the US Supreme Court are based on the writ of habeas corpus. Agamben interprets habeas corpus as the first recording of bare life as the new political subject… Nothing allows one to measure the difference between ancient and medieval freedom and the freedom at the basis of modern democracy better than this formula. It is not the free man and his statutes and prerogatives, nor even simply homo, but rather corpus that is the new subject of politics… You will have a body to show (Agamben, 1995, pp. 123–124).

References


